

## **NATO North Atlantic Council Committee Background Guide**

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With the signing of the Washington Treaty on the 4th of April, 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was created with the original goals of deterring Soviet expansionism, preventing nationalist militarism in Europe, and encouraging European political interaction following WWII<sup>1</sup>. The North Atlantic Council (NAC), which is the main political and decision-making body of NATO itself, consists of each member country allowed one seat in the council, and is moderated by the NATO Secretary General<sup>2</sup>. NAC policies are created out of the cooperation of all member countries of NATO, as the council favors unanimity<sup>3</sup>. In this background guide, NATO is referenced, but it is important to remember that the North Atlantic Council is the governing body for this committee, and the events and information in this background guide has directly affected and is directly linked to the NAC.

### **I. Evaluating and Enhancing Collective Defense (NATO Washington Treaty Article 5)**

#### **Statement of the Issue:**

Collective defense and Article 5 of the Washington Treaty has been central to NATO's existence since the Organization's creation in 1949, which binds all NATO members together through collective defense, protection, and solidarity if one is ever to be attacked<sup>4</sup>. Collective defense works where if one member of the alliance is attacked, it is considered an attack on all members, and member countries can decide how to help defend those being attacked<sup>5</sup>. The only invocation of NATO's Article 5 was after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States, with NATO launching anti-terror operations outside of Europe and North America. Article 5 has been proposed for other situations, such as Syria and the Russian invasion of Ukraine<sup>6</sup>, but has never been unanimously voted in favor since 2001. Since NATO's creation, collective defense and

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<sup>1</sup> "A Short History of NATO." North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Last modified June 3, 2022. [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/declassified\\_139339.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/declassified_139339.htm).

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> "Collective Defense - Article 5." North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Last modified June 8, 2022. [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_110496.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm).

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

what defines a situation of invoking collective defense has varied based on global political conditions, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine enables members to reconsider what collective defense means and entails.

As global political conditions continue to rapidly change, the definition of what collective defense is, and what actions are considered collective defense have come under fire in recent years. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has only created further complexities with NATO responding by shifting back towards a physical form of collective defense<sup>7</sup>. Global security and the developing environment of global politics call for a more complex understanding of collective defense with NATO, which includes not only military defense, but the incorporation of effects of attack on civilians, or attacks directed at civilians<sup>8</sup>. NATO has created the “NATO 2030” Initiative, founded at the Brussels summit in 2021 to introduce more measures to secure strong militarization of NATO, and adopt a more global, as opposed to regional, approach to security and defense<sup>9</sup>. Plans such as the Readiness Action Plan (RAP), launched in 2014, provided new options to members of NATO in terms of actions within collective defense<sup>10</sup>.

Currently, NATO has increased collective defense through physical measures due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine; this occurred through increasing arms and troops and the usage of NATO forces in surrounding countries of the war such as Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Poland, and Slovakia<sup>11 12</sup>. Alongside this, NATO members also have recently started using collective defense and other defense tactics such as deterrence against cyber-attacks, and other hybrid attacks<sup>13</sup>. Non-state actors conducting attacks pose challenges and questions as to if collective defense can be used on non-state actors<sup>14</sup>. One form of enhancing collective defense that many members of NATO have participated in is internal resilience, for example, strengthening societies’ capacities to take on the full range of threats and hazards. However, the COVID-19 pandemic did negatively affect most countries’ capacities to handle threats and crises<sup>15</sup>. Another

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<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> "Deterrence and Defense." North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Last modified March 28, 2022. [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_133127.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_133127.htm).

<sup>12</sup> "Enhancing NATO's collective defense: A conversation with former Supreme Allied Commanders Europe." Atlantic Council. Last modified January 28, 2022. <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/event/enhancing-natos-collective-defense/>.

<sup>13</sup> "Deterrence and Defense." North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Last modified March 28, 2022. [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_133127.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_133127.htm).

<sup>14</sup> Schmitt, Michael N. "The North Atlantic Alliance and Collective Defense at 70: Confession and Response Revisited." *Emory International Law Review* 34 (2019). <https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1225&context=eilr>.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

way NATO enhances collective defense, or attempted to, is through the creation of NATO guideline for all members to spend at least 2% of their own GDP on defense, creating large defense investment for members<sup>16</sup>.

Some critics of collective defense have found that prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine (who is a NATO partner but not a member state), the purpose of NATO and the usage of collective defense was diminishing rapidly. As NATO began focusing more on crisis operations and civilian operations, left NATO questioning its purpose as a military alliance<sup>17</sup>. As stated, 2022 provided a defining moment for NATO and collective defense, as countries surrounding Russia, either members or partners of NATO, began to revert towards the core definition of collective defense as fears of Russian invasion grew during the beginning of 2022<sup>18</sup>. Current evaluations of collective defense have called for economic enhancement, in which defense budgets were increased, and the usage of supplying lethal weapons to Ukraine through the European Peace Facility as well in response to the Russian invasion<sup>19</sup>. Russian invasion is not the only threat to the collective defense of NATO members, as there has also been a large shift towards the de-Westernization of crisis diplomacy that has pushed NATO somewhat out of the frame as countries like China, Russia, and others outside of in NATO step in<sup>20</sup>.

## History:

The Washington Treaty (also called the North Atlantic Treaty) was signed in April of 1949 by Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the UK, and the US<sup>21</sup>. This treaty was signed on by all countries aiming to “unite their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security”, and the treaty was then ratified by the United States in July, becoming binding for all in August of 1949<sup>22</sup>. With collective defense being mentioned in the preamble of the Washington Treaty, Article 5 stemmed from a treaty previous to the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty

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<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> Schmitt, Michael N. "The North Atlantic Alliance and Collective Defense at 70: Confession and Response Revisited." *Emory International Law Review* 34 (2019).  
<https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1225&context=eilr>.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

<sup>20</sup> de Hoop Scheffer, Alexandra. "Collective Defense is Now at the Forefront of NATO." German Marshall Fund of the United States. Last modified April 7, 2022. <https://www.gmfus.org/news/collective-defense-now-forefront-nato>.

<sup>21</sup> Schmitt, Michael N. "The North Atlantic Alliance and Collective Defense at 70: Confession and Response Revisited." *Emory International Law Review* 34 (2019).  
<https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1225&context=eilr>.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

Organization: the Brussels Treaty of 1948<sup>23</sup>. The Brussels Treaty of 1948 created the concept of collective defense between Britain, France, Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg which then led to the creation of NATO and Article 5<sup>24</sup>. The Brussels Treaty was created to demonstrate large European cooperation following the Second World War, with a goal of overall cooperation and reconstruction efforts on a multi-national level, which then encouraged the United States and other North American countries to join in on collaborative efforts in Europe<sup>25</sup>.

During the Cold War era following 1949, the United States had a large nuclear weapons arsenal, which by the 1960s, the Soviet Union grew their own arsenal greatly as well, leading to questions if nuclear weapons would be used if Article 5 was ever invoked, which the US did pledge to do<sup>26</sup>. During the late 1970s, NATO members agreed on a non-binding pledge to increase defense spending by 3% of the country's GDP, but was irregularly met and certain European political groups found that increasing spending in a very tense global political environment was "provocative"<sup>27</sup>. The terms of this pledge being left somewhat vague, NATO member states were left to interpret how their 3% defense spending would be allocated. Some members viewed collective defense spending at this time and into the 1980s as increasing arsenals and troops, while other countries and members of NATO participated strictly through resilience and deterrence, with mostly European countries focusing on a flexible and transitional response during the end of the Cold War<sup>28</sup>. Even today, Iceland does not have a standing army.

The end of the Cold War led to NATO expansion into Eastern European countries, and an increase in conflict in the Middle East that led to cases of regionalization in NATO<sup>29</sup>. Specifically, in Turkey, Article 5 and collective defense fell into questions on whether or not Turkey could use Article 5 as they were lending airbases in the Gulf War, with some NATO members stating that attacks on Turkey did not qualify a NATO response, and that by lending bases to US aircraft "they had acted provocatively"<sup>30</sup>. The case of Turkey also prompted questions of conditionality of Article 5, contradictory to the physical writing of Article 5 stating "an armed attack against one or more [allies] shall be considered an attack against them all." &

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<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

<sup>24</sup> Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopedia. "Brussels Treaty." *Encyclopedia Britannica*, November 29, 2016.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

<sup>26</sup> CRS Report for Congress. Received through the CRS Web. 97-717 F. July 17, 1997. NATO: Article V and Collective Defense. Paul E. Gallis

<sup>27</sup> CRS Report for Congress. Received through the CRS Web. 97-717 F. July 17, 1997. NATO: Article V and Collective Defense. Paul E. Gallis

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

"Rather, each signatory will assist the ally under attack with "such action it deems necessary, including the use of armed force...." (Washington Treaty)<sup>31</sup>.

During the mid-1990s up until 2001, NATO began to deal with both members and outside countries questioning what Article 5, collective defense, and NATO's purpose was without imminent Russian threat. Some began to viewing NATO shift from collective defense to collective security and dealing with diminishing effectiveness with the example of Bosnia and Herzegovina, where NATO forces began to interfere with Bosnia in the early 1990s attempting to establish peace during the Bosnian war, which began as crisis management but soon became extremely militarized<sup>32</sup>. The September 2001 9/11 attacks on the United States marked the only official invocation of Article 5, as the United States was attacked by non-state actors, prompting NATO to launch operations outside of Europe<sup>33</sup>.

The later 2000s and 2010s and NATO's collective defense began to see a shift from focusing on Article 5 to crisis management, and less projects about collective defense occurred, with NATO working on crises and civilian projects<sup>34</sup>. This shift from collective defense to crisis management created questions about cyber-attacks and hybrid attacks being possibly included into reasons for invoking Article 5, but NATO still today refers these types of threats to defense through resilience and deterrence<sup>35</sup>. Previous to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the purpose of NATO and the usage of collective of defense was diminishing rapidly. Cyberattacks, cyberterrorism, and other hostile tech operations on countries in NATO, and globally, break the original definition of attack on a member for NATO, and NATO has addressed this in the 2018 Brussels Summit Declaration, but the issue remains as a threat to NATO and NAC members to this day<sup>36</sup>

## **Analysis:**

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<sup>31</sup> Ibid.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

<sup>33</sup> "Collective Defense - Article 5." North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Last modified June 8, 2022. [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_110496.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm).

<sup>34</sup> CRS Report for Congress. Received through the CRS Web. 97-717 F. July 17, 1997. NATO: Article V and Collective Defense. Paul E. Gallis

<sup>35</sup> Schmitt, Michael N. "The North Atlantic Alliance and Collective Defense at 70: Confession and Response Revisited." *Emory International Law Review* 34 (2019).

<https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1225&context=eilr>

<sup>36</sup> Ibid.

Currently, collective defense has become central to NATO and the NAC following the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022<sup>37</sup>. The rapid global-political change that occurs during present day requires NATO to also incorporate civilian perspectives, as well as creating better consensus amongst a more diverse group of states as NATO continues to enlarge into Eastern Europe<sup>38</sup>. All NATO Concepts and Studies aim towards the similar goal of rebuilding NATO's military capacity and collective defense, while also attempting integration of Protection of Civilians in all NATO projects<sup>39</sup>. Following the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan in April of 2021, and the sudden militarization of NATO troops to respond to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, NATO has shifted focus from crisis management towards the recentralization of collective defense, deterrence, and cyber threat defense<sup>40</sup>. The shift back to collective defense in NATO also has member countries and scholars calling for the incorporation of understanding which populations will be affected of the alliance members, as civilians are becoming objectives of both military and political movements globally<sup>41</sup>.

Collective defense since 1949 has dealt with change and development, with larger hybrid and non-state attacks becoming more common, and the revitalization of Russia-Europe tensions through the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Collective defense now faces a dilemma of incorporating both old, basic physical defense tactics seen during the Cold War, and the incorporation of defense for tech, hybrid, and non-state attacks while accounting for civilian protection<sup>42</sup>. Enhancement of collective defense occurring in 1991 with Gulf War missile deployment, 2003 defensive measures package during the Iraq crisis, and the deployment of missiles to respond to the 2012 Syria crisis represent the changes of collective defense pre-Russian invasion, but NATO will now have to readdress how to create defensive measures for all members of the alliance, which has already included the deployment of NATO troops to aid in deterrence<sup>43</sup>.

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<sup>37</sup> "Enhancing NATO's collective defense: A conversation with former Supreme Allied Commanders Europe." Atlantic Council. Last modified January 28, 2022. <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/event/enhancing-natos-collective-defense/>.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid.

<sup>39</sup> Atkinson, Andrew. "The Protection of Civilians within Collective Defense." Stimson. Last modified November 4, 2021. <https://www.stimson.org/2021/the-protection-of-civilians-within-collective-defense/>.

<sup>40</sup> Atkinson, Andrew. "The Protection of Civilians within Collective Defense." Stimson. Last modified November 4, 2021. <https://www.stimson.org/2021/the-protection-of-civilians-within-collective-defense/>.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid.

<sup>42</sup> de Hoop Scheffer, Alexandra. "Collective Defense is Now at the Forefront of NATO." German Marshall Fund of the United States. Last modified April 7, 2022. <https://www.gmfus.org/news/collective-defense-now-forefront-nato>.

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**Conclusion:**

Evaluating and enhancing collective defense has become as central as possible for NATO and the North Atlantic Council in the past couple months, but the context of collective defense that requires defining and debate will need the incorporation of perspectives of members and partners in total. Physical collective defense and the militarization of NATO, alongside deterrence and resilience practices will be central to this committee, as new & updated forms of collective defense are in high demand in our rapidly changing world.

**Questions:**

1. What does collective defense look like now with the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine being seen as increased Russian aggression to NATO's east?
2. How can NATO incorporate protection of civilians, new forms of threats (cyber, hybrid, non-state) and perspectives of partner countries?
3. What will enhancing collective defense look like in the future, and what will it cost for members and partners of NATO?

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## I. Evaluating the NATO-Russia Partnership, Dialogue, and Diplomatic Efforts

### Statement of the Issue:

Following the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, NATO and the political governing body of NATO: the North Atlantic Council, have once again placed Russia at the center of their focus, as the invasion also highlights the rocky relationship Russia has with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization<sup>44</sup>. NATO and other institutions located in Western Europe and the United States have found that the invasion of Ukraine demonstrates the intense militarization of Russian foreign policy, which coincides the ongoing pattern of mistrust and dissent of NATO by Russia<sup>45</sup>. Some have since argued that the invasion also marks total abandonment of diplomatic efforts by Russia with NATO, similar to historical blockages and termination of partnerships between both Russia and NATO following the Cold War<sup>46</sup>.

The current NATO-Russia relationship we see today was formed through back and forth partnership & diplomacy efforts between the two, with the increased militarization of Russia and NATO being the outcome of many events, such as the annexation of Crimea in 2014<sup>47</sup>. NATO sought to foster bilateral cooperation with Russia since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. This has been attempted through the 1994 Partnership for Peace Program, NATO-Russia Council, Basic Document of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (1997), and in the 2002 Rome Declaration.<sup>48</sup> NATO-Russia Partnership began to decline rapidly following the annexation of Crimea, and with the ongoing war in Ukraine marks a quintessential rock-bottom of NATO-Russia relations<sup>49</sup>. Some argue that NATO-Russia relations faced high levels of incompatibilities, in government systems, economic opinions and systems, and overall failure of meeting a consensus due to incompatibilities<sup>50</sup>. Members of the North Atlantic Council see Russia as either partner or adversary, with one opinion reflecting hopes of partnership while the other views Russia as an opponent to NATO.<sup>51</sup> The NATO-Russia partnership is marked by an

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<sup>44</sup> Fix, Liana, and Steven Kiel. "NATO and Russia after the Invasion of Ukraine." *German Marshall Fund of the United States* (April 4, 2022). <https://www.gmfus.org/news/nato-and-russia-after-invasion-ukraine>.

<sup>45</sup> Fix, Liana, and Steven Kiel. "NATO and Russia after the Invasion of Ukraine." *German Marshall Fund of the United States* (April 4, 2022). <https://www.gmfus.org/news/nato-and-russia-after-invasion-ukraine>.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid.

<sup>47</sup> Tuomas Forsberg & Graeme Herd (2015) Russia and NATO: From Windows of Opportunities to Closed Doors, *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, 23:1, 41-57,

<sup>48</sup> Ibid.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid.

ongoing trilemma, where Russia wishes to achieve hostile event mitigation, defining combatants and noncombatants of enemies, and the physical removal and mitigation of insurgents<sup>52</sup>.

Recent events between both NATO members like the United States and European Union countries, as well as previous and ongoing events in Ukraine have caused an intense decline in dialogue and diplomatic relations between Russia and NATO members<sup>53</sup>. Both NATO and Russia in 2017 still supported the INF treaty (regulating nuclear arms, signed in 1987), citing Russian military being described by Putin as non-aggressive, but Russia also views NATO at times in violation of the INF treaty by spending ten times more than Russia on defense, which creates friction in diplomatic efforts and dialogues between NATO and Russia<sup>54</sup>. The United States withdrew from the INF (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces) Treaty on August 2, 2019 after the US Department of Defense cited Russia's blatant disregard. In its place, the New START treaty is the only arms deterrent treaty in place (it was recently expanded to 2026).

The current NATO-Russia relationship, following the invasion and ongoing war in Ukraine, is marked by high levels of mistrust, low communication, and targeted policies and political actions from both sides<sup>55</sup>. Some scholars argue that the current lack of partnership, diplomatic efforts, and dialogue can also be attributed to both NATO and Russia struggling to find their own identities on a political scale, with NATO reshifting focus from strict collective defense to incorporating civilian crises, and other projects, and with Russia still enduring the effects of the end of the Cold War<sup>56</sup>. Overall, both Russia and NATO have gone through rapid political change, alongside the rest of the world, and this rapid political change has pushed both Russia and NATO to use action to validate themselves on a global level<sup>57</sup>. Both entities share the goal of chasing and producing driving foreign policies through expansion, whether physical (invasion, "boots on ground") or political (enlarging influence)<sup>58</sup>.

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<sup>52</sup> Ibid.

<sup>53</sup> Kühn, Ulrich, and Anna Péczeli. "Russia, NATO, and the INF Treaty." *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 11, no. 1 (2017): 66–99. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/26271591>.

<sup>54</sup> Kühn, Ulrich, and Anna Péczeli. "Russia, NATO, and the INF Treaty." *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 11, no. 1 (2017): 66–99. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/26271591>.

<sup>55</sup> Kuveloglu, Ata Taha. "Transforming threats in the new millennium and adaptation of NATO." *Business, Economics and Management Research Journal* 5, no. 1: 13-25. <https://doi.org/https://dergipark.org.tr/en/download/article-file/2256441>

<sup>56</sup> Kuveloglu, Ata Taha. "Transforming threats in the new millennium and adaptation of NATO." *Business, Economics and Management Research Journal* 5, no. 1: 13-25. <https://doi.org/https://dergipark.org.tr/en/download/article-file/2256441>

<sup>57</sup> Ibid.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid.

The further breakdown of relations between NATO and Russia has been aggravated by Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, prompting NATO to enhance its collective defense efforts. For example, the United States is pushing the Europeans to acquire the F-35s because they are the only aircraft certified to carry US nuclear weapons, which is outlined under the necessary clause on nuclear-sharing responsibilities<sup>59</sup>. Contemporary collective defense not only faces the threat of Russian aggression as seen in the invasion of the Ukraine, but also through de-Westernization of crisis diplomacy, pushing the West (most members of NATO) out of the frame, with countries like China, Russia, and other countries and regions not included in NATO<sup>60</sup>.

### **History:**

The NATO-Russia partnership dates back to the creation of NATO and the North Atlantic Council in 1949 with the main goal of the newly born NATO to be deterrence and prevention of Soviet Expansion<sup>61</sup>. The Cold War posed challenges for Soviet and NATO dialogue, with one of the larger successes of NATO relations to the Soviet Union culminating in the INF Treaty (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty) attempting to eliminate a specific category of nuclear weapons threatening Europe and other countries during the 1980s<sup>62</sup>. The post-Cold War era, with the fall of the Soviet Union, created conditions for NATO to begin diplomatic efforts with Russia with the goal of building secure democratic policies and systems in the new Russia<sup>63</sup>. In one of the founding goals of NATO, the creation of Euro-Atlantic stability and prosperity, NATO needed to include Russia to obtain this goal to ensure security and stability for prosperity<sup>64</sup>. In the beginning of NATO-Russia partnership, dialogue and diplomatic efforts, the complex power systems and energy resource surplus of Russia created a unique alliance between the two, some even calling the NATO-Russia partnership as fragile and touchy alliance<sup>65</sup>.

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<sup>59</sup> de Hoop Scheffer, Alexandra. "Collective Defense is Now at the Forefront of NATO." German Marshall Fund of the United States. Last modified April 7, 2022. <https://www.gmfus.org/news/collective-defense-now-forefront-nato>.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid.

<sup>61</sup> "A Short History of NATO." North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Last modified June 3, 2022. [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/declassified\\_139339.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/declassified_139339.htm).

<sup>62</sup> Ibid.

<sup>63</sup> Tuomas Forsberg & Graeme Herd (2015) Russia and NATO: From Windows of Opportunities to Closed Doors, *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, 23:1, 41-57

<sup>64</sup> Tuomas Forsberg & Graeme Herd (2015) Russia and NATO: From Windows of Opportunities to Closed Doors, *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, 23:1, 41-57

<sup>65</sup> Ibid.

This first establishment of partnership was marked by positive interactions between Russia and NATO, with Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev viewing NATO nations as prospective allies, and displayed interest in NATO's political consultancy and human rights observation; but Kozyrev's opinions were not representative of Russian political elite, as many Russians viewed NATO as an aggressive bloc of countries that should be abolished, as NATO in the eyes of Russians sought to seek peace without institutional change<sup>66</sup>. In 1993, Russian foreign policy shifted from market-democracy towards a more nationalist focus which is marked by the refusal of the Russian Foreign Minister to sign the NATO Partnership for Peace document<sup>67</sup>. Russia was the first country to join the NATO Partnership for Peace program in 1994. Another shift in Russian foreign policy, as Russia did eventually sign the Partnership for Peace document in 1995, alongside other NATO documents, but Russian sentiment towards NATO began to swing away from NATO being an ally to rather an encircling organization attempting to enlarge it's<sup>68</sup>

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<sup>66</sup> Ibid.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid.

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Concerns over NATO enlargement led Russia to drafting a legally-binding treaty that prohibited former Soviet states from joining the organization.<sup>69</sup> In 1997, NATO responded to this treaty by proposing the Founding Act and the creation of the Permanent Joint Council, where Russia and NATO could mitigate the disagreements over the block's enlargement. Russia went on to sign the Founding Act and join the Permanent Joint Council<sup>70</sup>. Although, two years later in 1999, NATO continued their enlargement project by collaborating with Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czechia, and Hungary, which then damaged Russia-NATO relations even further, with Russian mistrust in NATO's article on Collective Defense being central in concerns. Similarly in 1999, the Kosovo Crisis in the falling Yugoslavia marked deployment of NATO forces without a UN Security Council mandate, with Russia's reaction to NATO deployment manifesting through freezing all relations with NATO ending the Permanent Joint Council, with Russia siding with Serbs and NATO siding with Albanians<sup>71</sup>.

Following the 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, Russia once again shifted to improve relations with NATO with Putin as the newly elected president, with the NATO Sec. Gen. visiting Moscow during the inauguration the Moscow NATO Information Office<sup>72</sup>. Both NATO and Russia aimed at improving relations through NATO addressing the change in the global security environment, and Russia was more willing to partner with NATO and other international bodies hoping to also gain recognition as a global power<sup>73</sup>. As for the members of NATO, older members were more pleased with Russian collaboration than other newer members. During the early 2000s, the creation of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) became the new successor to the Permanent Joint Council, and fulfilled both NATO goals of collaboration and influencing democracy, and also Russian goals of international recognition<sup>74</sup>. In 2004, the partnership between Russia and NATO peaked with Russian involvement in NATO's anti-terrorism operations, with NATO prompting further Russian agreement and involvement on peacekeeping and joint defense systems<sup>75</sup>.

Although, the years following 2003 began to turn towards poor dialogue between NATO and Russia as fears of NATO enlargement began to grow, with NATO ignoring Russian protests

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<sup>69</sup> Ibid.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid.

<sup>71</sup> Tuomas Forsberg & Graeme Herd (2015) Russia and NATO: From Windows of Opportunities to Closed Doors, *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, 23:1, 41-57,

<sup>72</sup> Ibid.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid.

of patrolling Baltic airspace and continuing to criticize Russian troops in Georgia and Moldova<sup>76</sup>. The color revolutions, specifically the Rose Revolution in Georgia and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine protesting Russian influence in Georgia and Ukraine where at times deemed by Russian political elites and the public as being influenced by the West, as members of NATO such as the United States invading countries in the Middle East<sup>77</sup>. Alongside US involvement in the early 2000s in the middle east, Russia refrained from continuing to implement democratic reforms, growing more authoritarian under the leadership of President Vladimir Putin. The early 2000s marked the beginning of a large wave of NATO expansion including former Soviet states (Baltics) and satellite states (Hungary, Poland, Czechia, Slovakia) led to the degradation of cooperative dialogue between NATO and Russia<sup>78</sup>.

By 2007, NATO-Russia partnerships, dialogue, and diplomatic efforts had declined rapidly, due to NATO enlargement that Russia found as endangering, specifically as NATO began to consider Georgia and Ukraine as possible members<sup>79</sup>. The 2008 Georgian War created an even greater divide between NATO and Russia, with NATO responding to Russian troops in Georgia by noting Russian violations of the six point peace agreement and Russia's peacekeeping duties with NATO, but it is worth noting that at this time that NATO did have troops on the ground in Afghanistan at this time<sup>80</sup>. Following the Georgian War, the United States proposed a Missile Defense Shield, which then deteriorated Russia-NATO relations even further, with NATO holding a dual position on Russia in 2009, with both sides having separate demands for the other addressing the consequences of both enlargement from NATO and invasion by Russia<sup>81</sup>.

By 2014 and the Russian annexation of Crimea, NATO-Russia relations had completely stopped, with NATO and Russia conducting no dialogue, partnership, and diplomacy efforts<sup>82</sup>. Rather, NATO-Russia relations could be described as NATO response to Russian annexation

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<sup>76</sup> Ibid.

<sup>77</sup> Smith, Julianne. "The NATO-Russia Relationship: Defining Moment or Déjà vu?" *Politique Étrangère* (2008): 759-73. <https://www.cairn-int.info/journal-politique-etrangere-2008-4-page-759.htm?WT.tsrc=pdf>.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid.

<sup>79</sup> Ibid.

<sup>80</sup> de Haas, Marcel. "NATO-Russia Relations after the Georgian Conflict." *University of Haifa* (April 2009). [https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Mordechai-De-Haas-2/publication/237778527\\_NATO-Russia\\_Relations\\_after\\_the\\_Georgian\\_Conflict/links/5416fbcc0cf2bb7347db84a5/NATO-Russia-Relations-after-the-Georgian](https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Mordechai-De-Haas-2/publication/237778527_NATO-Russia_Relations_after_the_Georgian_Conflict/links/5416fbcc0cf2bb7347db84a5/NATO-Russia-Relations-after-the-Georgian).

<sup>81</sup> Ibid.

<sup>82</sup> Klein, Margarete, and Claudia Major. "Perspectives for NATO-Russia relations: forms of confrontation dominate - but dialogue not excluded." *SWP Comments* 49 (November 2015). [https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/45561/ssoar-2015-klein\\_et\\_al-Perspectives\\_for\\_NATO-Russia\\_relations\\_forms.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y&lnkname=ssoar-2015-klein\\_et\\_al-Perspectives\\_](https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/45561/ssoar-2015-klein_et_al-Perspectives_for_NATO-Russia_relations_forms.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y&lnkname=ssoar-2015-klein_et_al-Perspectives_).

and involvement in Crimea by condemning Russia, freezing cooperation, and increasing militarization, which Russia responded to with halting their own efforts to NATO<sup>83</sup>. One treaty that is worth mentioning during the 2010s in NATO-Russia relations is the INF treaty, where both NATO and Russia supported the INF treaty in 2017, but both have found the other in violation in recent years<sup>84</sup>. With the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, current NATO-Russia relations are non-existent, as both have participated in increasing militarization, with Russia being found to have committed war crimes and targeting civilians, and have abandoned any efforts for relations<sup>85</sup>.

### **Analysis:**

The complete lack of partnership efforts, diplomatic efforts, and dialogue between NATO and Russia is the outcome of an ebbing and flowing relationship since the 1940s, when Russia was the Soviet Union. As Russia continues to have active troops in Ukraine, NATO has not shown any efforts at the time for diplomatic efforts, any many have questioned what NATO and Russia will do following the end of the war in Ukraine<sup>86</sup>. The evaluation of NATO-Russia relations cannot be summed up simply, as there are multiple historical events, socio-political contexts, and global events that rapidly changed the structure of both Russia and NATO must be taken into account to attempt to or decide not to recreate partnerships, diplomatic efforts and/or dialogue. NATO has continued to collaborate with its allies, most notably offering the chance for Finland and Sweden to hold votes on whether to join the alliance during the war in Ukraine, and how to eventually de-escalate the war.

As for the lingering outcomes of the color revolutions (Orange: Ukraine, Rose: Georgia), and both NATO & Russian involvement in regions such as former Yugoslavia persist, these historical events will become important to base evaluations and possible reconnection of partnership with Russia. Previous summits such as the Lisbon 2010 Summit Declaration that declare renewing the NATO-Russia Council, but also condemns Russian involvement in

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<sup>83</sup> Tuomas Forsberg & Graeme Herd (2015) Russia and NATO: From Windows of Opportunities to Closed Doors, *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, 23:1, 41-57,

<sup>84</sup> Kühn, Ulrich, and Anna Péczeli. "Russia, NATO, and the INF Treaty." *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 11, no. 1 (2017): 66–99. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/26271591>.

<sup>85</sup> Fix, Liana, and Steven Kiel. "NATO and Russia after the Invasion of Ukraine." *German Marshall Fund of the United States* (April 4, 2022). <https://www.gmfus.org/news/nato-and-russia-after-invasion-ukraine>.

<sup>86</sup> Fix, Liana, and Steven Kiel. "NATO and Russia after the Invasion of Ukraine." *German Marshall Fund of the United States* (April 4, 2022)

Georgia<sup>87</sup>. This type of declaration must be reworked, as the current Russia-NATO conditions make commitments from both Russia and NATO void.

As Russia does have a large energy resource, this economic potential could become an area of collaboration and potential de-escalation<sup>88</sup>. It is also important to remember that de-escalation following the Ukraine war, treaties like the INF treaty, amongst many others made between Russia and NATO will need to be re-addressed<sup>89</sup>. Military escalation has already occurred, but NATO should focus on preventing further escalation again in the Baltics and Russia, which could affect all of Europe even further, this will require rewriting the contexts of partnership between Russia and NATO<sup>90</sup>. Simultaneously, the NATO-Russia partnership should also be addressed in terms of recent sentiments expressed by Finland and Sweden to join NATO, the refusal of Ukraine to cede any of its territory, and the desire of Georgia to join the EU/NATO sphere, Russia's only real bordering ally in Europe is Belarus.<sup>91</sup>.

### **Conclusion:**

The North Atlantic Council will need to reevaluate the Russia-NATO relationship, which includes incorporating all back-and-forth actions between Russia and NATO, which although a large amount of history has become essential to the current lack of diplomatic relations. Any solutions of diplomatic efforts and reworking partnership between Russia and NATO will most likely include plans of de-escalation, and socio-political impacts of both Russian and NATO actions over the past few decades.

### **Questions:**

1. What did the Russia-NATO relationship look like and what events shaped it to where we are today?
2. How can the North Atlantic Council address Russian mistrust that has led to escalation, and how can both sides reconcile cooperation after the war?

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<sup>87</sup> "Lisbon Summit Declaration." *North Atlantic Council in Lisbon*, November 20, 2010.  
<http://202.49.69.66/pma/nccdaf3.pdf>

<sup>88</sup> Braun, Aurel, ed. *NATO-Russia relations in the twenty-first century*. Vol. 7. New York: Routledge, 2008

<sup>89</sup> Klein, Margarete, and Claudia Major. "Perspectives for NATO-Russia relations: forms of confrontation dominate - but dialogue not excluded." *SWP Comments* 49 (November 2015).  
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<sup>90</sup> Fix, Liana, and Steven Kiel. "NATO and Russia after the Invasion of Ukraine." *German Marshall Fund of the United States* (April 4, 2022)

<sup>91</sup> *Ibid.*

3. What does a Russia-NATO partnership look like in the future, and how can diplomatic efforts be made in a way that addresses historical events?

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